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DELAY & IRREPARABLE HARM: A STUDY OF
EXHAUSTION THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
IDEA *
ROSEMARY QUEENAN **
As the administrative state expands, and disputes involving important rights are
frequently decided within the administrative process, access to efficient
administrative law litigation has become increasingly critical. One procedural
aspect that has taken on greater importance is the exhaustion doctrine, which
requires litigants to proceed through the often-lengthy administrative process
prior to seeking judicial relief. Acknowledging that the exhaustion doctrine plays
an important part in preserving the appropriate role for courts in the
adjudication of these disputes, courts have long grappled with requests to bypass
the exhaustion requirement in various legal contexts, often navigating the
tension between the benefits of exhaustion and the harm caused by the procedural
delay. While courts have made exceptions to the requirement in certain cases,
the law on exhaustion remains unclear and one particularly vexing issue
remains: whether courts should insist that litigants exhaust any administrative
remedies prior to seeking relief when adherence to the exhaustion doctrine
threatens irreparable harm.
This Article examines the lack of clarity in the courts on the law of exhaustion
and proposes a legal framework for interpreting the exhaustion requirement in
cases where strict adherence to it causes irreparable harm through procedural
delay. To highlight the ways in which compliance with the doctrine can lead to
irreparable harm, and to explore a potential framework for addressing those
cases, this Article focuses on the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), which provides children with
disabilities the right to a free and appropriate education. The IDEA is the focus
of this Article because it has the potential to impact millions of children enrolled
in public schools who have a disability. It also illustrates the need for a path to
prompt judicial relief to prevent the threat of irreparable educational harm.
While the framework proposed in this Article addresses the exhaustion
requirement under the IDEA, it can also serve as a model to interpret
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exhaustion requirements in other legal contexts where prompt relief is warranted
based on irreparable harm caused by the administrative delay.
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INTRODUCTION
With the growth of the administrative state, the procedural aspects of
administrative law litigation have become critical in the adjudication of these
disputes. Recently, courts have been asked to consider requests for emergency
relief in highly politicized administrative law litigation, often based on claims
of irreparable harm. 1 In certain cases, one procedural aspect of such litigation
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017). In particular, cases in the
immigration context highlight the U.S. government’s requests for emergency relief based on
irreparable harm. For example, in Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), the court
contrasted the public interest of national security with the public interests of free travel, freedom from
discrimination, and avoiding the separation of families after President Trump issued an executive order
banning individuals from seven countries from traveling to the United States. Id. at 1156, 1169. In
considering the government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal after the district court
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that has taken on greater importance is the exhaustion doctrine, which requires
litigants to proceed through the often-lengthy administrative process prior to
seeking judicial relief. 2 Acknowledging that the exhaustion doctrine plays an
important role in preserving the appropriate—and, at times, deferential—role
of courts in the adjudication of these disputes, 3 courts have long grappled with
requests to bypass the exhaustion requirement in various legal contexts. 4 In
doing so, courts must navigate the tension between the benefits of exhaustion
and the harm caused by the procedural delay. While courts have made
exceptions to the requirement in certain cases, 5 the law on exhaustion remains
unclear. 6 Legal scholarship addressing the purposes and value of exhaustion
describes the doctrine as “troublesome to the courts” and notes that “many of
the decisions are confusing and poorly reasoned.” 7 For these reasons, some

enjoined enforcement of this order, the court found that the government did not suffer irreparable
harm from its claimed institutional injury. Id. at 1157–58, 1168; see also Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S.
Ct. 681, 683 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting inconsistencies with the government’s claim of
irreparable harm regarding its inability to enforce a new immigration rule: “the Government has come
to treat ‘th[e] exceptional mechanism’ of stay relief ‘as a new normal’” and courts “ha[ve] been all too
quick to grant the Government’s ‘reflexiv[e]’ requests” (quoting Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
140 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (first and third alterations in original))).
2. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938).
3. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine recognizes the
notion, grounded in deference to Congress’ delegation of authority to coordinate branches of
Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that
Congress has charged them to administer.”); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)
(noting the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine).
4. Requests to bypass exhaustion have been made in cases related to Medicare reimbursement,
see, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 348 F. Supp. 3d 62, 66–67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that the
court may waive the exhaustion requirements of the statute when the “issue raised is entirely collateral
to a claim for payment[;] . . . plaintiffs show they would be irreparably injured were the exhaustion
requirement enforced against them; [or] . . . exhaustion would be futile” (quoting Triad at Jeffersonville
I, LLC v. Leavitt, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008))), claims by inmates regarding unjustifiable
force and failure to protect, see, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855–56 (2016), and challenges to
prolonged detention without a bond hearing, see, e.g., Jarpa v. Mumford, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706, 710, 712,
725 (D. Md. 2016) (granting habeas relief and finding that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing habeas petition); see also Lawrence v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 274
U.S. 588, 590–92 (1927) (holding that an injunction was improper because, among other things, the
railroad had neither alleged nor shown that it would suffer irreparable injury if the administrative
agency were not enjoined).
5. See Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing
Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law
and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349, 384–411 (2009)
(providing examples of “cases in which courts have excused . . . exhaustion and plac[ing] them into
categories” as appropriate).
6. Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) (noting that “the law governing exhaustion of administrative remedies
is complex and confusing”); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Fail To Comment at Your Own Risk: Does Issue Exhaustion
Have a Place in Judicial Review of Rules?, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 124 (2018) (noting the confusion on
issue exhaustion in rulemaking and the inconsistent application of exceptions to the requirement).
7. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 3.
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scholars have called for courts to provide a “re-examination” of the doctrine,
“not only to indicate how the cases should be decided, but also to clarify the
issues sufficiently to guide parties’ behavior so that they may avoid litigation
over exhaustion’s requirements.” 8 One issue related to the exhaustion doctrine
that has proven particularly vexing is whether courts should insist that litigants
facing irreparable harm must exhaust any administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial relief when adherence to the doctrine threatens irreparable
harm. 9
This Article examines the lack of clarity in the courts on the law of
exhaustion and proposes a legal framework for interpreting the exhaustion
requirement in cases where procedural delay caused by strict adherence to the
requirement results in irreparable harm. To highlight the ways in which
compliance with the doctrine can lead to irreparable harm, and to explore a
potential framework for addressing those cases, this Article focuses primarily
on the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 10 a federal act that provides
children with disabilities the right to a free and appropriate education, because
it has the potential to impact the approximately 7.1 million public school
students who receive special education services. 11 This Article and its analysis
8. Id.; see also Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the
Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 550–51.
9. See, e.g., Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778
(3d Cir. 1994); L.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Sumner Sch. Dist., 166 P.3d 837, 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
10. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
Over time, Congress has amended the IDEA, and I use “the IDEA” to represent the IDEA as amended
to this day.
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
11. See Students with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
coe/indicator_cgg.asp#:~:text=In%202018%E2%80%9319%2C%20the%20number,of%20all%20public%
20school%20students [https://perma.cc/Y4JU-54SE] (last updated May 2020). The calculation of 7.1
million students refers to the number of students who received services in the 2018 to 2019 school year.
Id. For further data on this issue, see also Kelsey A. Manweiler, IDEAs That Provide a Solution When
the Courts Have Disabled the System, 38 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 47, 50, 54 (2018); SASHA
PUDELSKI AM. ASS’N SCH. ADM’RS, RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS 5 (2016),
https://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Educati
on/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/82RQ-URR3] (noting that “[i]n
2010, 95% of all U.S. students with disabilities were educated in public schools” compared to “only
20%” in 1970). “Under the IDEA, recognized disabilities include: intellectual impairment; learning
disability; physical, cognitive, or emotional developmental delays; physical disabilities (blindness,
deafness, etc.); ‘serious emotional disturbance;’ disabilities falling within the autism spectrum; and
other health impairments.” Manweiler, supra, at 51 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a)–(b) (2012)); see also
LINDA WILMSHURST & ALAN W. BRUE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SPECIAL EDUCATION 3
(Routledge ed., 3d ed. 2018) (“The number of students with disabilities, aged 3–21, who received
special education services in the United States in 1976–1977 was 3.7 million (8 percent of the school
population); however, in 2005–2006 that number had increased to 6.7 million students, representing
14 percent of the school. In 2013–2014, the number of children receiving special education was 12.9
percent of the student population.”).
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of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement also illustrate the need for a path to
immediate judicial relief to prevent the threat of irreparable educational harm.
Noting the uncertainty regarding the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, the
Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict regarding the scope of the
requirement but left open the question of whether exhaustion is required when
the plaintiff seeks relief for a denial of a free appropriate public education
(“FAPE”), “but the specific remedy [they] request[] . . . is not one that an IDEA
hearing officer may award.” 12 While my proposed framework is presented in
the context of the exhaustion requirement under the IDEA, it can serve as a
model for courts in interpreting exhaustion requirements in other legal contexts
where immediate or emergency relief is warranted based on the potential for
irreparable harm caused by the administrative delay.
The IDEA ensures that children with disabilities are provided with a
FAPE, which may include special education or related services intended to
provide meaningful education to children with disabilities. 13 Yet like in many
other administrative law contexts, the protections the IDEA affords students
and their families are often only realized through the assertion of legal rights
that must proceed through a time-consuming administrative process, which,
when challenged, is often ultimately resolved in the courts. 14 While this process
can be beneficial, it often comes at a significant price: children may be denied
access to much-needed special education services while the administrative
process works its way to completion, delaying or denying their statutory right
to a FAPE and, more broadly, a right to education that some states have
recognized as fundamental. 15 Circuit courts are split as to whether the
exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. 16 And courts have been unclear as to
12. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 & n.4 (2017) (“In reaching these
conclusions, we leave for another day a further question about the meaning of [the exhaustion
requirement]: Is exhaustion required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the
specific remedy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is not one that an IDEA
hearing officer may award?”).
13. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, §§ 611, 612(a)(1), 118 Stat.
at 2670, 2676–77(e)(3)(F) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)).
14. Id. § 615(l), 118 Stat. at 2730 (codified as amended at § 1415(l)).
15. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.”);
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir.) (recognizing a “basic minimum education to be a
fundamental right”), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020); L.D. ex rel. A.D. v.
Sumner Sch. Dist., 166 P.3d 837, 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
16. Compare Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.”), and
DM ex rel. MM v. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The failure of the [plaintiffs] to
exhaust their administrative remedies . . . deprives us of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.”),
with Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ailure to exhaust is normally
considered to be an affirmative defense . . . and we see no reason to treat it differently here.”), and
D.G. ex rel. N.B. v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The exhaustion
requirement . . . is not jurisdictional . . . .”).
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whether and when to make an exception to allow litigants to proceed to court
immediately without exhausting administrative remedies. 17 Some courts have
interpreted the requirement as a flexible rule, 18 noting that an exception may be
warranted based on futility 19 and in certain “emergency” situations.
An irreparable harm exception is particularly warranted in IDEA cases
involving time-sensitive determinations related to eligibility for special
education services because, in those cases, the denial of services pending
administrative resolution of the child’s case can create a situation where the
services, once denied, cannot be adequately provided at a later time. For
example, if a school district determines that a child is not eligible to receive
special education services during the summer months, known as extended
school year (“ESY”) services, it is unlikely that an administrative challenge to
that determination will be resolved prior to the start of the summer ESY
program. 20 In fact, in most cases, it will take at least one year—and often
longer—to conclude the administrative process. 21 No interim services are
provided to the child during the pendency of the administrative review
process. 22 As a result, even if the agency ultimately determines that the child
should have been eligible for ESY services, the child will have lost the benefit
of those services at the time they were intended to be provided. This results in
knowledge regression and irreparable educational harm to the child. 23 Indeed,
in one case, a student who sought ESY services was denied those services for
two years until the court ultimately reviewed the case and determined the school
district had incorrectly denied eligibility. 24 While scholars have raised the

17. See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 17.2 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter HICKMAN & PIERCE].
18. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The
exhaustion requirement is ‘not an inflexible rule.’” (quoting Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d
Cir. 1987))); Meehan v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“[T]he exhaustion doctrine is not an inflexible rule.”).
19. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988) (“It is true that judicial review is normally
not available . . . until all administrative proceedings are completed, but as we have previously noted,
parents may bypass the administrative process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.”) (first
citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n.17 (1984); and then citing 121 CONG. REC. 37,416
(1975) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“[E]xhaustion . . . should not be required . . . in cases where such
exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter.”)).
20. See, e.g., L.D. ex rel. A.D., 166 P.3d at 839–41.
21. See id. at 837, 839–41.
22. See generally Blakely Evanthia Simoneau, Stay Put and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: A Proposal for Clarity and Change, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 153 (2018) (exploring the
unresolved issues related to the IDEA’s “stay put” provision).
23. A recent study reported that “students with disabilities who had received ESY services
regressed significantly less than their counterparts who did not receive ESY services.” Lucy BarnardBrak & Tara Stevens, Association of Summer Extended School Years Services and Academic Regression, 73
SCH. PSYCH., Spring 2019, at 3, 6–9.
24. L.D. ex rel. A.D., 166 P.3d at 839–41.

99 N.C. L. REV. 985 (2021)

2021]

DELAY & IRREPARABLE HARM

991

impact exhaustion can have on time-sensitive IDEA cases, 25 they have not
focused on the irreparable educational harm caused by a denial of services
pending exhaustion’s procedural delay.
In order to address the harm to a child’s educational development during
the administrative delay, this Article proposes a framework for an irreparable
harm exception, which would be applied when exhaustion is likely to pose a
threat to childhood well-being, cause irreparable educational harm, and lead to
the loss of a statutory right. This proposal is consistent with the purpose of the
statute, the legislative intent behind the exhaustion requirement, and the
exceptions Congress foresaw when the IDEA was enacted. Part I analyzes the
doctrine of exhaustion generally and some of the tensions that have arisen as
the courts have interpreted the doctrine. Part II outlines the history of
education rights for children with disabilities, the enactment of the IDEA, and
the statutory right to a FAPE. Part II then focuses on the application of the
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, and the exceptions, as interpreted by the
courts. This analysis highlights a unique challenge presented by the exhaustion
requirement in IDEA cases involving time-sensitive determinations, such as
cases involving eligibility for special education services, where a child can wait
one or more years 26 to receive a final determination as to whether they are
entitled to services. It also underscores the need for a clearer, more consistent,
and more flexible approach to addressing the potential irreparable harm caused
by the procedural delay.
Part III proposes a framework for an irreparable harm exception to the
exhaustion requirement, which draws from the traditional “futility” and
“emergency” exceptions, while addressing the harm caused by the delay. This
Article suggests a factor-based analysis, which considers: (1) whether the denial
of the statutory right (for example, special education services) pending the
administrative review may result in irreparable harm (for example, the child
will regress, resulting in irreparable educational harm to the child); (2) whether
the claimant is entitled to interim relief pending the administrative review (for
example, whether the child is entitled to receive interim special education
services, such as ESY services, under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision 27 pending
25. See, e.g., Kent Sparks, Requiring Administrative Exhaustion While the School Shuts Down: An
Insurmountable Barrier To Seeking IDEA Enforcement, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1161, 1165.
26. Typically, an ESY determination is made in the spring of the academic year. Given the time
period required to complete the administrative process, the child often does not receive a final
determination until well after—sometimes more than one year after—the summer (when the services
should have been provided if it is determined that the student is eligible). For a discussion on the
standards applied to determine ESY eligibility, see Rosemary Queenan, School’s Out for Summer — But
Should It Be?, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 165, 176–96 (2015); see also L.D. ex rel. A.D., 166 P.3d at 843–44.
27. The “stay put” provision allows a child to “remain in [their] then-current educational
placement.” Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
§ 615, 118 Stat. 2647, 2725–26 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).
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the administrative review); and (3) whether subsequent relief can remedy the
irreparable harm. Part IV suggests that while this framework focuses on the
exhaustion requirement in the IDEA, it can also serve as a model for courts in
interpreting exhaustion requirements in other legal contexts where immediate
or emergency relief is warranted based on irreparable harm caused by the
administrative delay.
I. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
The doctrine of exhaustion is a “long settled rule of judicial administration
that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” 28 The concept is
well established, and its benefits are well known. 29 This part explores the
rationale, origin, and current landscape of the exhaustion doctrine and the
tension between the purpose of the requirement and a litigant’s need for swift
access to relief. This part also presents the current state of the exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine and suggests that, in order to address the tension, courts
need to clarify existing exceptions, including the irreparable harm exception, as
proposed in this Article.
A.

Rationale of Exhaustion

Exhaustion serves many purposes. Based on the idea that “agencies, not
the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress
has charged them to administer,” the doctrine guarantees the congressional
delegation of authority to agencies. 30 It also protects agency autonomy by
allowing the agency the opportunity to apply its expertise and exercise its
discretion. 31 Further, exhaustion aids judicial review by allowing the parties and
28. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938); Raoul Berger, Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981, 995 (1939) (quoting Myers, 303 U.S. at 50–51). The
doctrine’s roots stretch back to the refusal of equitable relief in the tax context. See Berger, supra, at
981–83.
29. Administrative review “allows for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state
and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a
complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity
to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for” children with disabilities. Polera v. Bd. of
Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298,
1303 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th
Cir. 1989) (“States are given the power to place themselves in compliance with the law . . . . Federal
Courts—generalists with no experience in the educational needs of handicapped students—are given
the benefit of expert factfinding by a state agency devoted to this very purpose.”).
30. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).
31. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1969); Polera, 288 F.3d at 487 (“The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was intended to channel
disputes related to the education of [children with disabilities] into an administrative process that could
apply administrators’ expertise in the area and promptly resolve grievances.”); HICKMAN & PIERCE,
supra note 17, § 17.2; Peter A. Devlin, Jurisdiction, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, and
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the agency to develop the facts of the case in the administrative proceeding. 32
Finally, it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of
administrative and judicial fact finding and avoiding judicial intervention if the
parties successfully resolve their claims administratively. 33
The duty of exhaustion can be imposed by common law or by statute. The
common law exhaustion requirement, which is rarely imposed and, therefore, is
not a focus of this Article, 34 has been described as “flexible and pragmatic” and
subject to court-imposed exceptions. 35 When exhaustion is mandated by statute,
courts have interpreted the requirement strictly, and some courts have even
found that failure to exhaust deprives the court of jurisdiction. 36 However, a
“mere reference to the duty to exhaust administrative remedies conferred in an
agency organic act is not enough to create a statutory duty to exhaust particular
remedies.” 37 A creature of judicial prudence, the exhaustion doctrine was
developed to address the courts’ reluctance to interrupt the administrative
Constitutional Claims, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1234, 1242 (2018); see also Bills ex rel. Bills v. Homer Consol.
Sch. Dist. No. 33–C, 959 F. Supp. 507, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Sparks, supra note 25, at 1176 (citing Rita
S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004));
Wasserman, supra note 5, at 361 n.47 (noting that the exhaustion requirement “allows for the exercise
of discretion and educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical
educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency
by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcoming[s] in their educational programs
for [children with disabilities]” (quoting Polera, 288 F.3d at 487)). Professor Lewis Wasserman’s
quotation of Polera omits the “s” in shortcomings; my first alteration reflects the quote as it appears in
Polera.
32. See Sparks, supra note 25, at 1176 (“Courts generally justify the [exhaustion] requirement . . .
by noting that the hearing process created a detailed factual record that can be subsequently used to
fully inform a court proceeding.”).
33. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 194.
34. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010)
(noting that the exhaustion requirement “will be applied under the following circumstances: (1) agency
expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme;
and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude
the need for judicial review”); see also William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies - New
Dimensions Since Darby, 18 PACE ENV’T. L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (“In any judicial review of agency action
under the APA, the traditional, judicially-derived doctrine of exhaustion is no longer applicable.”).
35. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.2; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, ARIANNE M. AUGHEY, DONALD MCGILLIVRAY, MEINHARD DOELLE & JASON
MACLEAN, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:36 (2d ed. 2020), Westlaw (database updated Sept.
2020) (“The lower federal courts in NEPA cases interpret McKart as having adopted a flexible
balancing test. . . . [B]ut the balancing test sometimes leads to confusing and inconsistent results in the
cases.”).
36. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“[T]his Court has no authority to create
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”). For an analysis of jurisdictional exhaustion
requirements, see Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2003); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra
note 17, § 17.2; Devlin, supra note 31, at 1243–46.
37. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.3 (“Courts interpret general references to the duty
to exhaust as mere codifications of the common law duty, subject to the usual pragmatic judge-made
exceptions to the duty.”).
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process prematurely with grants of equitable relief. 38 This was especially true
where administrative agencies were granted exclusive statutory authority to
award remedies. 39
One of the earlier applications of the exhaustion doctrine arose in the
habeas corpus context, 40 where detainees who claimed to be American citizens
sought habeas relief from immigration detention pending return to China. 41 In
interpreting an immigration statute, which delegated exclusive authority over
admission of aliens to customs and immigration agents of the then Department
of Commerce and Labor, the Court articulated a principle of exhaustion:
“before the courts can be called upon, the preliminary sifting process provided
by the statutes must be gone through with.” 42 Regardless of the purported
invalidity and ineffectuality of the statute, “it point[ed] out a mode of procedure
which must be followed before there can be a resort to the courts.” 43 The
exhaustion requirement 44 is also imposed in various other legal contexts,
including prisoner litigation, 45 labor law, 46 environmental law, 47 and special
education law. 48
B.

Tensions Related to Exhaustion

While the exhaustion doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. 49 suggests a strict rule, 50 scholars have noted that

38. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193; see also Rebecca L. Donnellan, Note, The Exhaustion Doctrine
Should Not Be a Doctrine with Exceptions, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 361, 363 (2001).
39. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193.
40. See United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 166 (1904).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 166–67, 170.
43. Id. at 167.
44. The doctrine of exhaustion is closely related to the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
ripeness. For a more complete analysis of the three doctrines, see HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17,
§ 17.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
46. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 184–85, 190–91 (1958).
47. See §§ 4321–4347; see also Paul D. Friedland, Comment, The Exhaustion Doctrine and NEPA
Claims, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 385, 388–89 (1979).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
49. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
50. Id. at 51 (“[T]he rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy cannot be
circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere
holding of the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable damage.”). The Court in
Myers relied on a long line of precedent. See Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 172
(1934); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1934); Porter v. Invs. Syndicate, 286
U.S. 461, 468, 471 (1932); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 279 U.S. 560, 563 (1929);
Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567, 575 (1928); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.,
274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927); Lawrence v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 592–93 (1927); Gorham
Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1924); Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 230 (1908); see also Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 699, 701 (1915)
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“[c]ourts have never interpreted the doctrine in this fashion . . . and instead
have created a complex and opaque facade of doctrine.” 51 This is, in part, due to
the courts’ discretion in applying the doctrine 52 and the challenge courts face in
determining whether to adhere to the rule strictly as a jurisdictional
requirement, which may result in “injustice, or create exceptions that avoid
injustice but dilute the concept of jurisdiction.” 53
Scholars have described the doctrine as “‘too rigid,’ ‘too complex,’
‘confusing,’ ‘antiquated,’ and ‘amorphous’” 54 and have also commented that “the
case law is hopelessly confused.” 55 In noting that “[t]he most serious problem
presented by the exhaustion doctrine concerns its very nature,” 56 Professor
Robert Power identified the tension between applying the doctrine as a “rule”
and applying it as a “guiding principle that administrative remedies should be
exhausted unless, on balance, the policies underlying the doctrine would be
better served by excusing exhaustion in the particular case.” 57 As a result,
decisions on exhaustion have been “unpredictable,” inconsistent, and likely to
result in “unnecessary litigation.” 58
An additional tension posed by the exhaustion requirement relates to the
timing and delay of judicial review. While exhaustion only delays and does not
prevent a party from eventually seeking judicial review, 59 Professor Power
noted that the timing can have a “substantial impact” on the party seeking
relief. 60 First, “[w]hile the plaintiff may ultimately succeed in court, the delay
(“[I]t is not for the courts to stop [administrative] officers of this kind from performing their statutory
duty for fear that they should perform it wrongly.”).
51. Power, supra note 8, at 551–52; see also Funk, supra note 34, at 10–11.
52. KOCH, supra note 34, § 12:21.
53. Devlin, supra note 31, at 1237.
54. Power, supra note 8, at 547 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424 (1965); then quoting 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26:1 (2d ed. 1983); then quoting Gelpe, supra note 6, at 3; then
quoting Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627,
627 (1983); and then quoting Comment, Limiting Judicial Intervention in Ongoing Administrative
Proceedings, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 452, 452 (1980)).
55. Funk, supra note 34, at 11.
56. Power, supra note 8, at 547–48.
57. Id. at 548; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) (“[A]dministrative
remedies need not be pursued if the litigant’s interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the
government’s interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is
designed to further.” (alteration in original) (quoting West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (1979))). The
Court identified circumstances where the litigant’s interests may outweigh the government’s interests,
including where requiring exhaustion may prejudice subsequent court action and where the agency is
unable to grant effective relief, making exhaustion futile. See id. at 146–49. The challenge courts face
in making these determinations is that balancing these interests is very case specific and turns on “the
nature of the claim presented and the characteristics of the particular administrative procedure
provided.” Id. at 146.
58. Power, supra note 8, at 548.
59. Id. at 553.
60. Id.
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in resolving the dispute may work a serious hardship.” 61 Additionally, “a delay
in judicial review may give the agency a strategic advantage. The longer a
challenged agency ruling or practice remains in effect, the more people will
acquiesce in it . . . [and] the more likely is some form of extrajudicial
settlement.” 62 Further, as noted by Professor Maria Gelpe, the exhaustion
requirement raises a practical concern of “foster[ing] needless litigation” that
can burden the courts and become costly to the defendant. 63 Exhaustion
litigation can also adversely affect an agency’s decision-making and “wrongly
influence[] courts to dispense with the exhaustion requirement.” 64 Scholars
have proposed various approaches to address this uncertainty related to the law
of exhaustion. 65
Scholars have also questioned whether the benefits attributed to a
mandatory exhaustion requirement are realized. The benefits of “administrative
autonomy” have been questioned “because almost every administrative action
is subject to judicial review, and all are subject to legislative review.” 66 The
benefits of judicial economy and administrative efficiency raise similar
questions. While resolving a matter through the administrative process is less
costly than resolving the matter in court, judicial economy is diminished if the
litigant incurs the cost of judicial review of the administrative decision. 67 In
turn, “administrative efficiency” is diminished “if a party initiates
administrative remedies and goes to court at the same time, forcing the agency
to incur costs in two forums.” 68 Finally, while there are benefits to giving an
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 3.
64. Id.
65. One proposal is a three-factor test that considers: the “extent of injury from pursuit of
administrative remedy,” the “degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and
involvement of specialized administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction.” HICKMAN &
PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.2 (noting that the three-factor test has “been applied in many circuit courts
opinions” but “is not ‘the law’ on exhaustion” because “the Court’s opinions on exhaustion do not form
a consistent and coherent pattern”). Others have proposed “abandoning the balancing approach for a
straightforward law of exhaustion with clearly defined exceptions recognized only upon strong
justification.” Gelpe, supra note 6, at 31. One scholar has suggested that “[p]roperly resolving
exhaustion questions demands a methodology that both serves the doctrine’s purposes and recognizes
the various settings in which the doctrine applies.” Power, supra note 8, at 557 (citing McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).
66. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 11 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 12 (“[A]dministrative resolution is less expensive . . . because administrative
proceedings are less formal, administrators with greater technical backgrounds can reach factually
accurate decisions more quickly, and administrative variance and review boards are less costly to
maintain than courts.”).
68. Id. at 14. Professor Gelpe notes that “[t]he administrative efficiency argument is convincing
in one type of exhaustion case that arises more frequently: when the unexhausted administrative
remedy is participation in an agency’s hearing or rulemaking proceeding,” where “[t]ypically, the
agency has conducted a hearing without the plaintiff’s participation; if the plaintiff had participated,
the agency might have resolved the issue with little extra work.” Id.
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agency the “chance to correct its own errors” through the administrative
process, it is not clear how often these benefits are realized. 69
C.

Exceptions to Exhaustion

Despite the rule of exhaustion, courts agree that in certain cases an
exception to exhaustion may be warranted. 70 With respect to a statutory
exhaustion requirement, “Congress sets the rules—and courts have a role in
creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to.” 71 As such, the
“[a]pplication of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its
purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved” 72 and “the
extent to which applying it in a particular context will further one or more of
these goals.” 73 Courts have also declined to require exhaustion in certain
circumstances, “even where administrative and judicial interests would counsel
otherwise,” 74 based on a “balance [of] the interest[s] of the individual in
retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” 75
Much of the confusion over the exhaustion doctrine relates to the courts’
inability to “identify” and define “a logically consistent set of exceptions.” 76
Scholars have noted that the “vague definitions of the exceptions and the trend”
to “determine whether to require exhaustion by weighing various considerations
as applied to a particular case” are problematic. 77
Inconsistency in applying exhaustion exceptions may also be attributed to
whether and how courts consider the merits of a case when deciding whether to
make an exception. 78 While considering the merits of each case aids in
understanding the potential harm of prejudice, it can also result in “inconsistent
treatment of similar cases” and litigants who “cannot accurately predict whether
a court would require exhaustion.” 79
A set of commonly applied exceptions have emerged, while a smaller set
of less commonly applied exceptions address potential prejudice or harm. For
example, the more commonly identified exceptions to exhaustion include cases
69. Id. at 15–16.
70. See id. at 25–27.
71. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016).
72. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
73. KOCH, supra note 34, § 12:21.
74. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992).
75. Id.
76. Power, supra note 8, at 558; see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.2 (“[T]he
[Supreme] Court’s opinions on exhaustion do not form a consistent and coherent pattern.”).
77. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 26.
78. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.2 (“All courts, including the Supreme Court, should
and do consider to some extent the merits of the issue they are being asked to resolve in the process of
deciding whether to apply the exhaustion requirement.”).
79. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 26–27.
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where administrative relief is unavailable or inadequate due to the agency’s lack
of authority to award relief—a category identified in the IDEA’s legislative
history. 80 Another widely recognized exception applies when exhaustion would
be “futile.” However, even the commonly recognized futility exception is not
clearly defined and has been described as a “shorthand reference for a variety of
situations in which administrative relief is more or less unlikely.” 81
The less accepted exceptions seem to stem from a more balanced approach:
“administrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant’s interests in
immediate judicial review outweigh the government’s interests in the efficiency
or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to
further.” 82 Examples of this balancing approach include instances where
“resort[ing] to the administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to
subsequent assertion of a court action,” or where “a particular plaintiff may
suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of
his claim.” 83
This existing framework suggests support for an irreparable harm
exception—the focus of this Article—which some courts have recognized may
be justified where the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if judicial review is
denied. However, the status of the irreparable harm exception is uncertain as
scholars have noted “[a]s a practical matter . . . irreparable injury is an abstract
standard that is almost impossible to meet.” 84 However, “[c]ourts seldom apply
this exception and even more rarely find that it excuses exhaustion except in
cases in which other factors also militate against requiring exhaustion.” 85 These
tensions can be seen through a study of the application of the exhaustion
requirement under the IDEA. In order to understand the context in which
exhaustion applies under the IDEA, it is necessary to review the rights afforded
by and the purpose of the legislation.

80. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973) (“[S]tate
administrative remedies have also been held inadequate . . . where the state administrative body was
found to be biased or to have predetermined the issue before it.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985)
(stating that it would not be appropriate to exhaust administrative remedies when “the hearing officer
lacks the authority to grant the relief sought”).
81. Power, supra note 8, at 579.
82. West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1979).
83. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146–47 (first citing Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986);
and then citing Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 773 (1947)).
84. Power, supra note 8, at 588.
85. Power, supra note 8, at 588; Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion
of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28 TEX. L. REV. 168, 179–82 (1949); see, e.g.,
FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1938) (concluding that the expense and inconvenience of litigation are not
sufficient to justify an exception to exhaustion).
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II. EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
Public education is a cornerstone of democracy. It has been recognized by
the Supreme Court as “the most important function of state and local
governments” and a “right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.” 86 Since the advent of public education in the United States, however,
children with disabilities have faced significant barriers to obtaining equal
access to education. This part details the historical battles children with
disabilities have faced to obtain a quality education, culminating in the passage
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (“EAHCA”), 87 the
precursor to the modern-day federal statutory IDEA framework. This part then
explores the procedural aspects of the IDEA, including the statutory basis for
the exhaustion requirement, as well as the state administrative barriers that
claimants must navigate to meet the exhaustion requirement and suggests that
the commonly asserted exceptions to the IDEA exhaustion doctrine almost
always fall short.
For many years, children with disabilities were denied access to proper
education. Students with disabilities “were either totally excluded from schools
or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were
old enough to ‘drop out.’” 88 The right to education for children with disabilities
began with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education 89 and was
guaranteed by Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania 90 and
Mills v. Board of Education, 91 where the court ordered that “no child eligible for
a publicly supported education in the District of Columbia public schools shall
be excluded from a regular public school assignment by a [r]ule, policy, or
practice of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its agents.” 92
In the early 1970s, 93 Congress began investigating issues related to
education for children with disabilities, and the Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped determined that, of the 8 million children who were in need of
special education services, only 3.9 million had adequate educational services,
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621
(6th Cir.) (finding “a basic minimum education to be a fundamental right”), vacated, reh’g en banc
granted, 958 F.3d 1216, 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
87. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
88. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court reasoned that, “[i]n these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity . . . is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Id. at 493.
90. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
91. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
92. Id. at 878.
93. See Timeline of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), UNIV. OF KAN. SCH. OF
EDUC. & HUM. SCIS., https://educationonline.ku.edu/community/idea-timeline [https://perma.cc/
7zDS-DUFK].
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2.5 million were receiving a substandard education, and 1.75 million were not
in school at all. 94 This resulted in the enactment of the EAHCA in 1975 to
address concerns that children with disabilities were “excluded entirely from
the public school system,” “did not receive appropriate educational services,”
and had “undiagnosed disabilities,” often as a result of a “lack of adequate
resources within the public school system.” 95 The EAHCA required states to
“establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all [children with
disabilities]” and “provide procedures for insuring that [children with
disabilities] and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards
in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement,”
among other things. 96 The EAHCA was later renamed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 97 which was intended “to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education” 98 that is “designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and independent living.” 99

94. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2); S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 5, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N 1425,
1429 (noting that prior to the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1966,
“the Federal Government had done little to assist in the education of [children with disabilities],
and the effectiveness of existing programs was dissipated by the lack of a single strong
administrative body. The Bureau of Education for the Handicapped was established by this law
in order to provide the leadership necessary in this field”); Manweiler, supra note 11, at 51 (first citing
Megan McGovern, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA, 21 WIDENER L.
REV. 117, 118 (2015); and then citing OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
THROUGH IDEA 3 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35history.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU8P-C54A]).
96. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432; Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612(2)(A), (5), 89 Stat. 773, 780–81 (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412). A “child with a disability” is defined as a child “(i) with intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by
reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
97. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat. at 773. In 1990, when Congress
reauthorized the Act, it changed the name to the IDEA. Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat 1103, 1141–42 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C.). The IDEA was again reauthorized in 2004. Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647, 2647 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
98. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, § 601(d)(1)(A), 118 Stat.
at 2651 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)); 34 C.F.R. § 300.1(a) (2020); Bd. of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181, 188 (1982).
99. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, § 601(d)(1)(A), 118 Stat.
at 2651 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). In 2004, the IDEA was reauthorized and
the purpose section amended to specify that special education students are also preparing for “further
education.” Id.
FAPE is defined as:
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The IDEA’s FAPE mandate requires states to provide “specially designed
instruction” and “supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a child
with a disability to benefit from special education.” 100 FAPE incudes special
education and related services 101 that “[a]re provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge” and “in conformity with
an individualized education program [(“IEP”)].” 102 In order to provide a FAPE,
the child’s IEP must include an educational program that is “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” 103 and “make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 104
Once it is determined that a child is eligible for FAPE under the IDEA, 105
the child is evaluated by a team of individuals 106 to discuss and document
special education and related services that— (A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
Id. § 1401(9). Interpreting the FAPE requirement, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory
definition “tend[ed] toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive” and applied the following twopart test: “First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the
individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188, 206–07 (footnotes omitted).
Educational benefits continue to be the subject of much discussion and debate within the area of special
education law. See, e.g., Queenan, supra note 6, at 175–76.
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A), (29).
101. Special education and related services can include “transportation and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services as are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education, and includes speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting
services, psychological services, [and] physical and occupational therapy,” among other services. 34
C.F.R. § 300.34(a) (2020).
102. Id. § 300.17(a), (d).
103. Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017)
(quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). The Court in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982),
however, declined “to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits
conferred upon all children covered by the Act.” Id. at 202. This was due to “the Act requir[ing] States
to ‘educate a wide spectrum’ of children with disabilities and that ‘the benefits obtainable by children
at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end.’”
Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
104. Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
105. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a) (2020) (“Child with a disability means a child evaluated in
accordance with [34 C.F.R.] §§ 300.304 through 300.311 as having an intellectual disability, a hearing
impairment (including deafness), a speech or language impairment, a visual impairment (including
blindness), a serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this part as ‘emotional disturbance’), an
orthopedic impairment, autism, traumatic brain injury, an other health impairment, a specific learning
disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special education
and related services.” (emphasis omitted)).
106. See id. § 300.23 (“Individualized education program team or IEP Team means a group of
individuals . . . that is responsible for developing, reviewing, or revising an IEP for a child with a
disability.” (emphasis omitted)). Various individuals are required to participate as part of the IEP team.
Id. § 300.321 (requiring the IEP team to include “(1) The parents of the child; (2) Not less than one
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appropriate services for the child. The IEP process results in a written
document, which describes the child’s current academic performance,
establishes objectives and goals for improvements in that performance, and
“describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the
child to meet those objectives.” 107 Services can include modifications in
instructional design or support services such as speech-language therapy,
physical and occupational therapy, or other adaptive services. 108 Special
education services can also include summer special education services—ESY
services—that are provided beyond the typical 180-day school year 109 “to
prevent serious regression over the summer months.” 110
Described as “the centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system
for [children with disabilities],” 111 the IEP “serves as the ‘vehicle’ or ‘means’ of
providing a FAPE.” 112 The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is through the
IEP that ‘[t]he “free appropriate public education” required by the Act is
tailored to the unique needs of’ a particular child.” 113 Members of the IEP team
must review a student’s IEP annually in order to ensure that it is tailored to the
unique needs of the child, 114 which is in line with the IDEA’s goal of
“provid[ing] each child with meaningful access to education by offering
individualized instruction and related services appropriate to [their] ‘unique
needs.’” 115 While the first IEP meeting must be scheduled within thirty days
after the school district determines the child is eligible for services, 116
subsequent annual IEP reviews are often scheduled in the spring so that the
regular education teacher of the child (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular education
environment); (3) Not less than one special education teacher of the child . . . ; (4) A representative of
the public agency . . . ; (5) An individual who can interpret the instructional implications of evaluation
results . . . ; (6) At the discretion of the parent or the agency, other individuals who have knowledge or
special expertise regarding the child . . . ; and (7) Whenever appropriate, the child with a disability”).
107. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19), amended as 20 U.S.C.
§ 1436).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).
109. See L.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Sumner Sch. Dist., 166 P.3d 837, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992)).
110. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1027–28 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
111. Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017).
112. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 753 (2017).
113. Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)).
114. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP team includes the student’s parent(s) or
guardian(s); a representative of the local education agency; at least one of the student’s general
education teachers; at least one of the student’s special education teachers; “an individual who can
interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results”; other individuals, “at the discretion of
the parent or the agency, . . . who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child”; and
“whenever appropriate, the child with a disability.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
115. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 755 (first citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29); and then citing Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192, 198 (1982)).
116. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c) (2020).

99 N.C. L. REV. 985 (2021)

2021]

DELAY & IRREPARABLE HARM

1003

IEP team can assess the child’s progress over the last year and determine
whether services should be adjusted for the next academic year. 117 In the event
that the parent or guardian seeks to challenge the IEP, the IDEA’s exhaustion
provision requires the parent or guardian to proceed through an administrative
review process prior to seeking relief from the court.
A.

Exhaustion Under the IDEA

The IDEA provides a statutory exhaustion requirement, which requires
claimants to pursue administrative appeal procedures prior to seeking judicial
relief. 118 But courts have noted that the “exhaustion requirement is not a rigid
one, and is subject to certain exceptions.” 119
The IDEA’s exhaustion section provides:
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . [Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under
such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [stateestablished administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as
would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA]. 120
The first portion of the exhaustion provision is intended to make clear that
other federal statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”) 121 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 122
provide “separate vehicles . . . for ensuring the rights of” children with
disabilities. 123 The second half of the provision, beginning with “except that,”
includes the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Read together, this section
requires that a plaintiff who brings a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures if the plaintiff is
seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA. 124

117. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
118. Id. § 1415(l).
119. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302–03 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Kerr Ctr.
Parents Ass’n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1990)).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
121. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
and 47 U.S.C.).
122. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
123. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 750 (2017) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at
4 (1985)). In Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), the Court noted that while
exhaustion is not required under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, exhaustion is required when the
plaintiff brings a claim under those statutes if they are also seeking relief under the IDEA. Id. at 754.
124. See id. at 754.
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The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is included in the statute’s
“procedural safeguards” provision, which includes detailed due process
procedures and requirements related to notice, 125 consent, the parents’ right to
participate in the development of their child’s IEP, and the right to a due
process hearing. 126 The procedures and requirements under the IDEA’s
exhaustion provision provide the child’s representative with the opportunity to
participate in mediation 127 or file a complaint for an impartial due process
hearing. 128 While the states have some discretion in establishing their due
process procedures—for example, some states have implemented a two-tier
system that includes a hearing at a local level and an appeal to the state
educational agency 129—the process begins with a preliminary meeting with the
school. 130 If the matter is not resolved, the complaint proceeds to a “due process
hearing” before an impartial hearing officer and, in some states, 131 also includes
a review by a state review officer of the state’s department of education. 132 Only
125. § 1415(d)(2). The state or local education agency is required to establish “[p]rocedures that
require either party . . . to provide due process complaint notice.” Id. § 1415(b)(7)(A).
126. See id. § 1415(b)(1), (d)(2).
127. Id. § 1415(b)(5), (e)(1) (requiring the state or local educational agency to “ensure that
procedures are established and implemented to allow parties . . . to resolve such disputes through a
mediation process”).
128. Id. § 1415(f) (providing the requirements for an impartial due process hearing). Specifically,
the exhaustion provision requires that “before the filing of a civil action . . . the procedures under
subsections (f) and (g) [of this section] shall be exhausted.” Id. § 1415(l). Further, the exhaustion
provision provides that
[w]henever a complaint has been received . . . the parents or the local educational agency
involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing,
which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency,
as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.
Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
129. Elizabeth Shaver, Every Day Counts: Proposals To Reform IDEA’s Due Process Structure, 66 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 143, 151 (2015); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2)(J). States determine whether due process
will follow a one- or two-tier structure. Shaver, supra, at 151. In a one-tier system, the due process
hearing is held at the state level. Id. In a two-tier system, the hearing is conducted at the local level and
an appeal of a hearing officer’s decision is filed with the state educational agency before a party can file
suit in state or federal court. Id. Most states have adopted a one-tier system. Id. at 151–52.
130. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) (“Prior to the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing . . . the local
educational agency shall convene a meeting with the parents and the relevant member or members of
the IEP Team.”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) (2020).
131. For example, in New York, once a decision is issued by the impartial hearing officer, each
party has a right to appeal the decision to a state review officer. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
8, § 200.5(k) (Westlaw with amendments included in the New York State Reg., Volume XLIII, Issue
13 dated Mar. 31, 2021). However, as noted, most states have a one-tier system. Shaver, supra note 129,
at 152.
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(g). States have the option to select either a one-tier system, in which a
single hearing takes place, or a two-tier system, which includes an additional review. Shaver, supra note
129, at 151. “If the hearing . . . is conducted by a local educational agency, any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State
educational agency” and “[t]he State educational agency shall conduct an impartial review of the
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if the parents are not satisfied with the administrative outcome can they seek
judicial review by filing a complaint in state or federal court. 133
In IDEA cases, exhaustion has many purposes. Exhaustion “prevent[s]
premature interference with agency processes,” provides the agency with an
“opportunity to correct its own errors,” “afford[s] the parties and the courts the
benefit of [the agency’s] experience and expertise,” and allows the agency to
“compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.” 134 The Supreme Court
has noted that allowing a claim without requiring exhaustion under the IDEA
would “render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined
in the statute” and “run counter to Congress’ view that the needs of [children
with disabilities] are best accommodated by having the parents and the local
education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each
[child’s] education.” 135
Indeed, the majority of appellate courts have interpreted the requirement
strictly, finding it to be jurisdictional. 136 This interpretation is based on the
findings and decision appealed.” § 1415(g)(1)–(2). For the reviews conducted by the state educational
agency, “[t]he officer conducting such review shall make an independent decision upon completion of
such review.” Id. § 1415(g)(2).
133. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
134. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194–
95 (1969); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the exhaustion
requirement “was intended to channel disputes related to the education of [children with disabilities]
into an administrative process that could apply administrators’ expertise in the area and promptly
resolve grievances”); Devlin, supra note 31, at 1242; see also Bills ex rel. Bills v. Homer Consol. Sch.
Dist., 959 F. Supp. 507, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Sparks, supra note 25, at 1176 (citing Rita S. ex rel.
Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Off. of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004)). In sum, the
exhaustion requirement promotes various benefits of efficiency and expertise. See Wasserman, supra
note 5, at 361 n.47 (noting that the requirement “allows for the exercise of discretion and educational
expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers
development of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the
first opportunity to correct shortcoming[s] in their educational programs for [children with
disabilities]” (quoting Polera, 288 F.3d at 487)). Professor Wasserman omits the “s” in shortcomings
in their article, but the plural form of the word—“shortcomings”—is used in Polera; my alteration
reflects the language as it appears in Polera.
135. Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011–12 (1984)).
136. There remains a conflict in the circuit courts as to whether the IDEA exhaustion requirement
is jurisdictional. Wasserman, supra note 5, at 412; see, e.g., Polera, 288 F.3d at 483 (“A plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.”);
Fliess v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 90 F. App’x 240, 242 (9th Cir. 2004); Babicz v. Sch. Bd., 135 F.3d
1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Devlin, supra note 31, at 1236 (stating that jurisdictional rules
“govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority’” and that “[c]ourts may not create exceptions to jurisdictional
defects, and parties may not waive or forfeit them” (citing J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 837 F.3d 1119, 1038
(W.D. Wash. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir.
2016))). But see Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[L]ack of exhaustion
usually is waivable, as lack of jurisdiction is not.” (quoting Charlie F. v. Bd of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 991
(7th Cir. 1996))); Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “is not jurisdictional”).
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IDEA’s requirement that plaintiffs have access to federal or state courts only
after the completion of the administrative process. However, other courts have
described the requirement as a “claims-processing rule” 137 and scholars have
noted that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not “contain[] ‘sweeping
and direct’ statutory language” that characterizes it as jurisdictional. 138 While
courts are generally reluctant to make exceptions to statutory exhaustion, even
courts that find the requirement to be jurisdictional have excused exhaustion
based on the Act’s legislative history, which recognizes that “there are certain
situations in which it is not appropriate to require the use of due process and
review procedures set out in [the IDEA] before filing a law suit.” 139 Courts note
that “in determining whether these exceptions apply, [the] inquiry is whether
pursuit of administrative remedies under the facts of a given case will further
the general purposes of exhaustion and the congressional intent behind the
administrative scheme.” 140
B.

Exceptions to the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement

Congress’s intent to allow for exceptions to the IDEA exhaustion
requirement is clear from a statement by its principal author, Senator Williams:
“I want to underscore that exhaustion . . . should not be required for any
individual complainant filing a judicial action in cases where such exhaustion
would be futile either as a legal or practical matter.” 141 The legislative history
provides further support for several categories of exceptions, 142 including when
(1) it would be futile to use the due process procedures . . . ; (2) an agency
has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is
contrary to the law; (3) it is improbable that adequate relief can be

137. Mosely, 434 F.3d at 533 (citing Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)).
138. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 17, § 17.3.
139. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985).
140. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992) (first citing Bowen
v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986); and then citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.
185, 193 (1969)).
141. 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
142. For example, courts that have addressed whether agency policies that are contrary to the law
qualify as an exception have determined that a “challenge to policies, rather than . . . a challenge to an
individualized education program” is insufficient to justify a waiver of the exhaustion requirement.
Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1304. Rather, a claimant must also establish that “the underlying purposes of
exhaustion would not be furthered by enforcing the requirement” such as cases that involve “statutory
violations so serious and pervasive that the basic statutory goals are threatened.” Id. (citing J.G. v. Bd.
of Educ., 830 F.2d 444, 446 (2d Cir. 1987)) (noting that “practices amounting to wrongdoing” were
“inherent in the program”)); N.M. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 851
(10th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he gravamen of the Association’s lawsuit is that the entire special education
service system offered by the State is infirm.”). Focusing on the “contrary to the law” language, courts
have determined that this exception applies when “questions of law are involved in determining the
validity of a policy, as when the policy facially violates the IDEA.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305.
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obtained by pursuing administrative remedies . . . ; and (4) an
emergency situation exists . . . . 143
Consistent with the legislative intent, courts have recognized various
exceptions in IDEA cases, including futility and emergency situations. 144 But
the courts “have not articulated a comprehensive standard for determining
when exactly the exhaustion requirement applies.” 145 While the futility
exception has been recognized when the agency cannot adequately award relief,
such as in cases involving systemic violations, no clear definition of futility has
emerged. As to the emergency situation exception, courts have noted that it
should be “sparingly invoked” and requires a heavy burden. 146 Some scholars
suggest that this exception falls “within the futility exception.” 147 Lastly, a few
courts have recognized an irreparable harm exception, though claimants rarely
succeed in securing this exception.
This Article suggests that the irreparable harm exception should be
recognized by the courts uniformly and proposes a framework that would
provide clarity for courts and litigants as to when the exception should be
applied. 148 An irreparable harm exception is consistent with the futility and
emergency situation exceptions and directly addresses the educational
irreparable harm that results from exhaustion’s delay. Before turning to the
proposed framework for applying an irreparable harm exception, the following
sections explain why both the futility exception and the emergency exception
fail to adequately address the concerns involved with irreparable educational
harm.

143. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985); see also Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000)
(quoting Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989)).
144. Courts have also excused exhaustion in cases seeking monetary relief on the ground that such
relief is not available under the IDEA. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 63–64
(1st Cir. 2002). For discussion of additional exhaustion exceptions, see Wasserman, supra note 5, at 386
(noting other exceptions, including “the agency’s failure to implement unambiguous IEP requirements
. . . the agency’s denial of access to the IDEA’s due process procedures . . . [and] the absence of an
IDEA administrative forum to adjudicate the dispute”).
145. Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Devlin, supra note
31, at 1249 (“When it comes to the [IDEA], courts are so confused by the statute’s exhaustion
requirement that they ignore the issue and apply exceptions even before knowing its jurisdictionality.
The result is either limbo or non-jurisdictional exhaustion with exceptions.”).
146. Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Rose, 214 F.3d at 212) (rejecting a student’s argument that not being able to graduate with his class,
due to a setback caused by a disability, constituted an emergency situation).
147. Wasserman, supra note 5, at 395.
148. See id. at 396 (listing a variety of situations in which courts have excused exhaustion). In
IDEA cases, this lack of clarity often presents challenges for the parent or guardian as the party seeking
to bypass the exhaustion requirement—typically the parent—has the burden of proving an exception
applies. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 622 (1984).
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1. The Futility Exception
The futility exception, identified by Congress, is one of the most
commonly recognized exceptions to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.
Congress suggested that the exception may apply where “it would be futile to
use the due process procedures (e.g., an agency has failed to provide services
specified in the child’s individualized educational program[)].” 149 Courts have
recognized the futility exception in cases involving an agency’s bad faith, 150
cases involving “systemic violations,” 151 and cases where “administrative
procedures do not provide [an] adequate remed[y],” 152 such as where the
plaintiff seeks monetary damages for physical injuries. 153 However, courts seem
to be divided as to whether exhaustion is required when the claimant seeks
monetary damages. 154 Some courts have excused exhaustion in cases in which
149. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985).
150. Some courts recognize the futility exception based on the bad faith of the agency, but others
note that exhaustion should not be waived “because the past pattern of an agency’s decisions shows that
the agency will probably deny relief.” Gelpe, supra note 6, at 40; see also Lauren A. Koster, Note, Who
Will Educate Me? Using the Americans with Disabilities Act To Improve Educational Access for Incarcerated
Juveniles with Disabilities, 60 B.C. L. REV. 673, 695–96 (2019).
151. N.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004). Some courts have
analyzed these cases under the “policy or practice of generalized applicability” exception. Hoeft v.
Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d
148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)); Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 205 (2d. Cir.
2007) (quoting Mrs. G. ex rel. J.G. v. Bd. of Educ., 830 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1987)); Mrs. W. v.
Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1987); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268,
1275 (10th Cir. 2000); H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985); see also Barron v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655
F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2011); Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999).
Courts have declined to waive the exhaustion requirements in cases where the child has graduated,
cases involving allegations of psychological harm, and cases in which the child has been placed in a
private school program. See Fraser ex rel. Fraser v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., 281 F. App’x
746, 748 (9th Cir. 2008).
153. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have “found damages unavailable
under the IDEA.” Polera, 288 F.3d at 485 (citing Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
1996)); see also Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1998). “The purpose of the IDEA is to
provide educational services, not compensation for personal injury, and a damages remedy—as
contrasted with reimbursement of expenses—is fundamentally inconsistent with this goal.” Polera, 288
F.3d at 486. Courts are split as to whether to waive exhaustion when the relief sought cannot be granted
by the administrative hearing officer. Katherine Bruce, Vindication for Students with Disabilities: Waiving
Exhaustion for Unavailable Forms of Relief After Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
987, 1001–02 (2018) (“Once again, we do not address here (or anywhere else in this opinion) a case in
which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that an IDEA officer
cannot give—for example, as in the Frys’ complaint, money damages for resulting emotional injury.”
(quoting Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 754 n.8 (2017))).
154. Compare W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 496 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that “damages are
available as a remedy” in a § 1983 action for IDEA violations and excusing “any exhaustion
requirement” because the relief sought is “not available in an IDEA administrative proceeding”), and
Covington v. Knox Cnty. Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 918 (6th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh’g and
suggestion for reh’g en banc (May 2, 2000) (“[I]n this case exhaustion would be futile because money
damages, which are unavailable through the administrative process, are the only remedy capable of
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the child seeks damages for severe physical or mental injuries. 155 Although rare,
some courts have also made an exception where the case would not
“substantially benefit by having an administrative record” 156 or where “an
adverse decision [is] a certainty.” 157
While courts have been reluctant to find futility based solely on
administrative delay, 158 courts have recognized that harmful delay caused by
exhaustion, established by a high standard of proof, may warrant an exception. 159
In Polera v. Board of Education, 160 the Second Circuit denied the plaintiff’s claim
of futility, finding that “[w]hile the administrative process might not have
delivered relief as swiftly as [the plaintiff] hoped, it certainly could have
compensated for the relatively minor delay with additional remedial educational
services.” 161 The court cautioned against applying “[s]weeping exceptions” that
“would swallow the exhaustion requirement.” 162 Similarly, in Christopher W. v.
Portsmouth School Committee, 163 the First Circuit rejected the claimant’s futility
argument, finding that the plaintiff “produced no evidence” to support
futility. 164 Although it opened the door for an exception based on irreparable
harm, the court also noted that “there are instances in which application of the
exhaustion doctrine will not serve” the agency expertise or judicial economy
redressing [the student’s] injuries.”), and Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the “[p]laintiff was not required to exhaust the formal administrative processes
of the IDEA” because he “seeks only money damages, which is not ‘relief that is available under’ the
IDEA”), with Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff seeking money damages could not proceed with the claim without first exhausting the IDEA’s
administrative remedies), and Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996)
(dismissing a claim for failing to first pursue the IDEA’s administrative remedies), and D.G. ex rel.
N.B. v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (“As the plaintiff has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, the plaintiff may not proceed with her § 1983 claims for violations of
the IDEA.”).
155. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 390; see also Padilla ex rel. Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1271, 1274
(excusing exhaustion when parents were seeking only monetary damages for a fractured skull and
exacerbation of their child’s seizure disorder that occurred while their child was placed unsupervised in
a windowless closet); Witte, 197 F.3d at 1276 (excusing exhaustion when parents were seeking only
monetary damages from substantial physical and verbal abuse to their child).
156. Sparks, supra note 25, at 1177 (citing N.S. ex rel. J.S., 386 F.3d at 114); see also Virginia H. ex
rel. Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (“If no factual record
needs to be developed, i.e. the matter is purely legal, to proceed through the administrative proceedings
is unnecessary.”).
157. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Network, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.3d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
158. See, e.g., Polera, 288 F.3d at 490 (“The supposed slowness of the administrative process also
does not justify a finding of futility in this case.”).
159. Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1095 (1st Cir. 1989).
160. 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002).
161. Id. at 490. The court also noted that it was “incongruous that [the plaintiff] waited years
before pursuing any remedy, yet now claims that the remedy available to her at the time—the
administrative process—would have been too slow.” Id.
162. Id. at 489.
163. 877 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1989).
164. Id. at 1095.
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interests. 165 Such instances include “when exhaustion ‘will work severe harm
upon a litigant,’ or when ‘[f]urther agency proceedings may be futile, only
delaying an ultimate resolution,’ and that ‘the legislative history of the Act
reflects the understanding that exhaustion is not a rigid requirement.’” 166
2. The Emergency Exception
The emergency exception has historically been narrowly applied and
courts have cautioned that “it is to be sparingly invoked.” 167 The circumstances
warranting its application are unclear, beyond Congress’s suggestion that it be
applied when “the failure to take immediate action will adversely affect a child’s
mental or physical health[].” 168 In Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle
River Board of Education, 169 the parents of an eight-year-old boy sought an
emergency order from the court (while the administrative proceeding was
pending) for tuition expenses for their child’s placement in a private residential
facility. 170 The parents argued that they were unable to continue to pay for their
child’s tuition and that absent placement at the residential facility, their child,
who was currently “suffering immediate, substantial and irreparable harm,”
would be “physically, permanently and irreparably educationally harmed.” 171
The district court dismissed the complaint for “lack of jurisdiction” because the
plaintiffs had not “yet exhausted the procedures required by the Act.” 172 The
Third Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings because the “district
court was under the misapprehension that it lacked authority to exempt parties
from exhaustion of remedies in proper circumstances in Disabilities Education
Act cases.” 173

165. Id.
166. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770,
774 (1st Cir. 1981)). The court in Christopher W. misquoted Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770 (1st
Cir. 1981), by placing “will” before “work severe harm” without adding an ellipsis to account for
omitted language from Ezratty. Compare Christopher W., 877 F.2d at 1095 (stating application of the
exhaustion doctrine would not serve the doctrine’s interest “when exhaustion ‘will work severe harm
upon a litigant’”), with Ezratty, 648 F.2d at 774 (“Sometimes to require exhaustion will not only waste
resources but also work severe harm upon a litigant.”).
167. Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778–79 (3d Cir.
1994).
168. Id. at 778 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985)).
169. 13 F.3d 775 (3d Cir. 1994).
170. Id. at 777; see Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)
(finding that courts can “order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private
special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement . . . is proper”).
171. Komninos, 13 F.3d at 777–78. The parents initially sought administrative relief after the school
board denied their request to place their child in a residential facility and twice moved for emergency
relief before the administrative law judge. Id. at 777.
172. Id. at 778.
173. Id. at 781.
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Although the Komninos court did not reach a determination as to whether
an exception to exhaustion applied, the decision highlights the challenge parents
face in interpreting the courts’ decisions on exhaustion exceptions. In
“adopt[ing]” the “emergency situation exception,” the Komninos court cautioned
that “mere allegations . . . of irreversible harm will not be enough to excuse the
completion of administrative proceedings.” 174 Further, the court stated that
“[p]laintiffs must provide a sufficient preliminary showing that the child will
suffer serious and irreversible mental or physical damage (e.g., irremediable
intellectual regression) before the administrative process may be
circumvented.” 175
After identifying the threshold requirement for the emergency exception,
the court raised doubt as to whether “‘regression’ per se constitutes such
irreparable harm as to justify an exception to the exhaustion requirement”
because “the skills lost in regression may be recouped” even though “[students
with disabilities] take longer than the non-handicapped to regain their previous
achievements.” 176 This observation from the court seems squarely in opposition
to educational studies regarding rates of regression among students with
disabilities 177 as well as the court’s further suggestion that “[a] showing . . . that
the regression will be irreversible would demonstrate irreparable harm and
would relieve plaintiffs from the obligation to finish the administrative process
before seeking judicial relief.” 178
The Komninos court’s analysis establishes a high standard focused on
“irreversible mental or physical damage” to justify the emergency exception,
consistent with Congress’s suggestion that the exception is warranted when “the
failure to take immediate action will adversely affect a child’s mental or physical
health[].” 179 This language suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with
cases where the child was in immediate danger of physical or mental harm, such
as Witte v. Clark County School District, 180 where the child sought monetary
damages for alleged physical and verbal abuse by a teacher and an aide, 181 or
Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. School District No. 1, 182 where the parents sought damages
for physical injuries sustained by their daughter, allegedly caused by the school
placing her in an unsupervised, windowless closet. 183

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 778–79.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 779–80.
See Barnard-Brak & Stevens, supra note 23, at 3–8.
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 780.
Id. at 779; H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985).
197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1273–74.
233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1271.
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Although the emergency exception has not been extended to cases where
the child suffers irreparable educational harm, some courts, including the First
Circuit, have recognized that there is a need to recognize an exception when
exhaustion would cause “severe harm upon a litigant.” 184 The need for an
irreparable harm exception is particularly warranted in cases where a child
suffers educational irreparable harm as a result of the delay caused by the
administrative review process. In fact, irreparable harm has already been
recognized as an exception to the exhaustion requirement in other legal
contexts, including in environmental, social security, and retirement cases. 185
III. A PROPOSAL TO RECONSIDER EXHAUSTION AND ADDRESS
IRREPARABLE EDUCATIONAL HARM
Many scholars and special education advocates have acknowledged the
challenges presented by the exhaustion requirements and have proposed various
legislative- or policy-based recommendations. While these proposals have
noted the concerns related to the delay caused by the administrative review
process, none have focused on the potential educational harm caused by the
denial of special education services pending administrative review. After a brief
review of these prior proposals for reform, this part proposes a new framework
for an irreparable harm exception that would directly address the tension
between the benefits of exhaustion and the need to promptly resolve disputes
in order to prevent educational harm and protect the right of children with
disabilities to a FAPE.
A.

Prior Proposals for Reform

The effort to seek changes to the IDEA’s procedural framework began in
2001, when President Bush created the Presidential Commission on Excellence
in Special Education, which published a report that concluded that “IDEA
184. Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1095 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis
omitted); Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774 (1st Cir. 1981).
185. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 476 (1986) (noting that to waive the
administrative exhaustion requirement for a challenge to the procedure used by the Social Security
Administration in determining eligibility for disability benefits, the claimants must show that (1) “the
claims were collateral to any claim for benefits” and (2) “the harm imposed by exhaustion would be
irreparable”); Gulf Restoration Network, Inc. v. Salazar, 683 F.3d 158, 176 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that
although petitioners did not assert or establish a basis for the irreparable harm exception in a case by
environmental organizations challenging the Department of Interior’s plans for oil wells, “court[s] may
. . . excuse the failure to exhaust where ‘irreparable injury will result absent immediate judicial review’”
(quoting Dawson Farms LLC v. Farm Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 606 (5th Cir. 2007))); Grumbine
v. Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund, 638 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (“In general, courts will
excuse a failure to exhaust ‘only if the claimant is threatened with irreparable harm, if resort to
administrative remedies would be futile, or if the claimant has been denied meaningful access to the
plan’s administrative procedures.’” (quoting Tomczyscyn v. Teamsters, Loc. 115 Health & Welfare
Fund, 590 F. Supp. 211, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984))).
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dispute resolution warranted ‘serious reform.’” 186 Congress acknowledged that
“parents and school districts needed ‘expanded opportunities to resolve their
disagreements in positive and constructive ways.’” 187 Such efforts resulted in
minor legislative reform in 2004 with an amendment of the IDEA to require
“parties to attend a ‘resolution session’ that must take place within fifteen days
after a due process complaint is filed unless both parties agree to waive the
session or to go to mediation.” 188 However, it has been noted that “[t]he 2004
Amendments were quite modest in terms of altering the structure of due
process.” 189
In 2016, the American Association of School Administrators (“AASA”)
issued a report, Rethinking the Special Education Due Process System, 190 intended
to address “problems with the current [IDEA] statute as well as proposed
improvements.” 191 The AASA report focuses on various recommendations for
handling special education disputes without the use of the due process hearing.
For example, the AASA recommends replacing the current due process system
with a “mandated facilitated IEP meeting” and a “special education consultancy
model” with the opportunity for mediation to resolve the dispute before
proceeding to litigation. 192 Others have recommended an amendment to the
IDEA “to authorize bringing a direct action under IDEA” in certain
circumstances 193 and “creating emergency and interim hearing procedures,
strengthening notice, reinstating the right to expert witness fees, shifting the
burden of proof to school districts, reinstating the catalyst theory for attorneys’
fees, and increasing the number of publicly funded lawyers.” 194 Nonetheless,

186. Shaver, supra note 129, at 156–57 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N. ON EXCELLENCE
IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND
THEIR FAMILIES 40 (2002), https://ectacenter.org/~pdfs/calls/2010/earlypartc/revitalizing_special
_education.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHD4-DX5R]).
187. Id. at 145 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012)).
188. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
§ 615(f)(1)(B), 118 Stat. 2647, 2720–21 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)); see also
Shaver, supra note 129, at 155 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2012)).
189. Shaver, supra note 129, at 156.
190. PUDELSKI, supra note 11.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 18.
193. Wasserman, supra note 5, at 422.
194. Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 495, 507
(2014); see also RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION 4–5, 153–60, 169–72 (2013); Elisa Hyman,
Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and
Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
107, 156–59 (2011); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1448–49 (2011) (discussing the “previously common practice of awarding
attorneys’ fees in cases where the litigation was the catalyst for a change in the defendant’s conduct
(the so called ‘catalyst rule’)”); Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for
a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 526, 532, 538–39 (2013)
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proposals have been described as inadequate to preserve the due process hearing
rights under the IDEA. 195 While these proposals address concerns related to
cost, fairness, and expertise, most do not directly focus on the irreparable harm
to the child caused by the administrative delay. 196
Irreparable harm has long been raised as a basis for which to make an
exception to the exhaustion requirement. 197 While some courts 198 have
recognized an exception based on “severe or irreparable harm,” 199 the exception
has not been universally accepted or applied. 200 Courts that have recognized this
exception in IDEA cases have noted that it “draws its support” from the
emergency exception. 201 But the legislative history suggests that the emergency
exception is intended to apply to circumstances where the child is placed in
immediate physical or mental harm as a result of actions, behavior, or
circumstances that occur in a school setting. 202 Thus, an exception focused on
addressing educational harm is still needed.
B.

A Proposal To Address Irreparable Educational Harm

A universally recognized irreparable harm exception is necessary to
address cases in which the delay caused by exhaustion results in a denial of
services that causes the child to regress academically in a way that cannot be
adequately remedied at a later time. The exception is particularly needed in the
context of IDEA cases involving time-sensitive determinations as to eligibility

(arguing that, in the context of special education, due process as we know it is “unworkable . . . because
the procedural elements of objective fairness conflict with subjective and outcome fairness”).
195. See Weber, supra note 193, at 495–96.
196. Shaver, supra note 129, at 145 (“Advocacy organizations and scholars contend that, even with
these dispute resolution mechanisms in place, special education dispute resolution still is too expensive
and time-consuming.” (citing PUDELSKI, supra note 11, at 7)).
197. Davis, supra note 85, at 168–69; Gelpe, supra note 6, at 48 (“Several authorities suggest that
a litigant need not exhaust its administrative remedies when doing so would cause irreparable injury.”).
198. The First, Second, and Third Circuits have recognized a severe and irreparable harm
exception. See T.H. v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 14–cv–516, 2014 WL 2931426, at
*5 (S.D. Ohio June 27, 2014) (first citing Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 211 (1st Cir. 2000); then citing
Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 2007); and then citing
Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ. 13 F.3d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 1994)).
199. See Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000) (addressing the plaintiff’s argument for
an exception based on futility and “potential for severe harm to the litigant”); Christopher W. v.
Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1097 (1st Cir. 1989); Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770,
774 (1st Cir. 1981); Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 2007);
Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994).
200. See T.H., 2014 WL 2931426, at *5 (“The Sixth Circuit has never expressly adopted the
irreparable harm exception.”).
201. Id.
202. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 (1985) (providing that “there are certain situations in which it is
not appropriate to require [exhaustion],” including when “an emergency situation exists (e.g., the
failure to take immediate action will adversely affect a child’s mental or physical health)”).
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for special education services. 203 Irreparable harm has been recognized as a valid
basis for an exception in other legal contexts, including in cases involving
criminal prosecution, where the doctrine “can be exceedingly harsh,” 204 as well
as in the context of the denial of social security benefits for individuals with
intellectual disabilities. 205
An exception based on irreparable harm is consistent with the principle
that the “substance of a real ‘irreparable injury’ claim is not that the plaintiff
will fail before the agency, but that the process of seeking agency relief will
cause injury.” 206 With that in mind, the irreparable harm exception should apply
in IDEA cases based on the following factors: (1) whether the procedural delay
and denial of the services may result in regression and irreparable educational
harm to the child; (2) whether the child is entitled to receive interim services
pending the administrative determination; and (3) whether the harm resulting
from the administrative delay can be adequately remedied at a later time.
1. Procedural Delay and Denial of Services
The IDEA includes specific time periods by which each part of the
administrative review process should be completed. When a parent files a
complaint, they have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which
is conducted by a state or local educational agency. 207 While states have some
discretion in establishing their due process procedures, 208 the process typically

203. Others have advocated for an exception to exhaustion in cases involving time-sensitive claims
under the IDEA, such as situations where parents are seeking to prevent a school from closing. See
Sparks, supra note 25, at 1165 (“[T]he time-sensitive nature of a looming school closing should allow a
parent to forego administrative exhaustion and bring an action for a preliminary injunction directly to
the courts to adjudicate the underlying merits of the claim.”).
204. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969).
205. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469–70, 477–78 (1986); Grumbine v. Teamsters
Pension Tr. Fund, 638 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Irreparable harm has also been recognized
in the context of environmental law cases. See, e.g., Gulf Restoration Network, Inc. v. Salazar, 683 F.3d
158, 181 (5th Cir. 2012).
206. Gelpe, supra note 6, at 48.
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). In order to receive federal financial assistance, states are required
to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the IDEA. See Individuals with
Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 615(a), 118 Stat. 2647, 2715 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)). Specifically, the IDEA requires states to “establish and maintain
procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of a [FAPE].” Id. Parties are also provided with an opportunity
to participate in mediation. Id. § 615(b)(4), 118 Stat. at 2716, 2719 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(5), (e)(1)) (requiring the state or local educational agency to “ensure that procedures are
established and implemented to allow parties . . . to resolve such disputes through a mediation
process”).
208. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(B), (f)(1)(A). States determine whether due process will
follow a one- or two-tier structure. Shaver, supra note 129, at 151. In a one-tier system, the due process
hearing is held at the state level. Id. In a two-tier system, the hearing is conducted at the local level and
an appeal of a hearing officer’s decision is filed with the state educational agency before a party can file
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begins with a preliminary meeting with the school “within 15 days of receiving
notice of the parents’ complaint.” 209 Once a party has provided notice of a
complaint, if the matter has not been resolved “within 30 days of the receipt of
the complaint, the due process hearing may occur.” 210 In some states, the process
includes a review by a state review officer of the state’s department of
education. 211 The administrator must reach a final decision within forty-five
days, and if the child’s representative is not satisfied with the administrative
outcome, they can then seek judicial review by filing a complaint in state or
federal court. 212
The IDEA timeline requirements were established with the “ultimate goal
. . . [of] resolv[ing] special education disputes quickly and efficiently so that the
child’s education does not suffer.” 213 However, even in the most expedited
cases, the determination is often delayed 214 in order to allow time for the parties
to obtain relevant documentation, seek expert testimony, or seek an
independent evaluation. 215 And the statutory time periods are waived once the
child’s representative requests additional time to gather evidence. 216 As noted
suit in state or federal court. Id. Most states have adopted a one-tier system. Id. at 152 (“Currently,
forty-one states and the District of Columbia have a one-tier system.”).
209. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) (“Prior to the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing . . . the
local educational agency shall convene a meeting with the parents and the relevant member or members
of the IEP Team . . . .”).
210. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
211. See id. § 1415(f)–(g). States have the option to select either a one-tier system, in which a single
hearing takes place, or a two-tier system, which includes an additional review. See Shaver, supra note
129, at 151. “If the hearing . . . is conducted by a local educational agency, any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State
educational agency” and “[t]he State educational agency shall conduct an impartial review of the
findings and decision appealed . . . . The officer conducting such review shall make an independent
decision upon completion of such review.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)–(2). For example, in New York,
once a decision is issued by the impartial hearing officer, each party has a right to appeal the decision
to a state review officer. N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(5)(v) (Westlaw with
amendments included in the New York State Reg., Volume XLIII, Issue 13 dated Mar. 31, 2021).
However, most states have a one-tier system. Shaver, supra note 129, at 152.
212. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.515(a), 300.516(a) (2020).
213. Shaver, supra note 129, at 146.
214. See Mary A. Lynch, Who Should Hear the Voices of Children with Disabilities: Proposed Changes
in Due Process in New York’s Special Education System, 55 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 (1991) (referring to the
forty-five-day requirement for a hearing officer’s decision and noting that in “discussions with
attorneys for children with disabilities, as well as school district attorneys, the refrain echoes—‘never
saw it happen’”). Delays are often caused by “[s]cheduling conflicts,” due to attorneys’ schedules, school
personnel vacation or limitations on working hours, witness availability, and hearing officers’ workload.
PUDELSKI, supra note 11, at 15 (citing S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544–899 (2012)).
215. Lynch, supra note 214, at 184–85.
216. Id. at 185. Generally, matters of timing are left to the school board’s discretion. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.343(a) (2006). That discretion is abused, however, when decisions are delayed for illegitimate
purposes—such as to deny parents the ability to exercise their due process rights guaranteed under
other sections of the regulations. Timely decision-making is critical to the integrity of the rights granted
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by the Supreme Court, “[a] final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP . . .
in most instances come[s] a year or more after the school term covered by [the]
IEP has passed.” 217 While the case is pending, the child’s parent or guardian is
presented with a challenging decision: “go along with the IEP to the detriment
of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to
be the appropriate placement.” 218
There are many examples of delayed resolutions in IDEA cases. Recently,
the Eleventh Circuit decided a case in which it noted that “[o]ver two years
passed before the [administrative law judge (“ALJ”)] even concluded hearings
in [the] case, and then another fifteen months before the ALJ rendered its
decision,” followed by another year before the district court issued an
opinion. 219 It took over five years before a final judgment was issued in the
case. 220
In L.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Sumner School District, 221 it took two years for the
child to receive a final determination as to whether he was eligible for ESY
services. 222 A.D.’s parents challenged the school district’s determination that
A.D., age fifteen, was not eligible for ESY services, even though he had
previously received special education services, including ESY services, since the
second grade, at another school. 223 The school’s determination was based on a
lack of “academic data to show that A.D. would benefit from ESY services”
because there was conflicting evidence “that A.D. was making good progress in
improving his academic skills” but “needed ESY services for behavioral

under the IDEA. In particular, unduly late decisions infringe upon parents’ rights to administrative
review of IEP decisions within established timelines. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)–(b) (2020) (giving
parents a right to a due process hearing); id. § 300.515(a) (setting a forty-five-day limit on the review
process).
217. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).
218. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993) (quoting Sch. Comm. of
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370). Scholars and special education advocates have criticized the administrative
exhaustion procedures as “expensive, time consuming, and counterproductive to a collaborative parentschool relationship.” Shaver, supra note 129, at 159 (analyzing the various proposals offered to reform
the special education due process procedures). One of the main criticisms of the current IDEA
administrative process is that “it is anticollaborative and poisons the school-parent relationship,
ultimately to the detriment of the child.” Id. at 161. Unlike the parties in some other disputes, with
disputes involving the IDEA the child will often continue their relationship with the school district
after the case has been resolved. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1988) (noting the sevenyear time period before the case reached the Supreme Court and that the Court “previously noted that
administrative and judicial review under the EHA is often ‘ponderous’” (quoting Sch. Comm. of
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370)).
219. N.N.J. ex rel. L.J. v. Sch. Bd., 927 F.3d 1203, 1209 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019).
220. Id.
221. 166 P.3d 837 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
222. See id. at 839–42 (noting that the foregoing case was filed in 2005 and a final determination
was reached in 2007).
223. Id. at 839–41.
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reasons.” 224 A.D.’s mother ultimately filed an administrative due process
hearing under the IDEA. 225 After prehearing conferences and a hearing, which
continued from November 2005 through January 2006, the ALJ ordered the
school district “to provide A.D. with ‘the number of hours of instruction or
counseling he would have received if he had participated in a 2005 ESY
program’” and that such services were “to be delivered during mid-winter break,
Spring break, Summer break, or Winter break . . . through August 2007.” 226 In
support of the decision, the ALJ noted the “many-year history of receipt of
ESY” that supported A.D.’s request and need for ESY services, which the
school district disregarded. 227 The school district appealed to the federal district
court. 228 In an opinion issued September 5, 2007—two years after the initial
ESY meeting—the district court affirmed the ALJ’s determination, finding that
by denying A.D. ESY services, the school district “failed to provide A.D. with
a FAPE.” 229 Though the court finally affirmed A.D.’s right to ESY services,
that determination came two years too late.
Similarly, in Reusch v. Fountain, 230 a group of students with disabilities
asserted that the school district systematically failed to provide them with an
opportunity to seek ESY services in violation of the IDEA. 231 The case began
with the filing of a request for a due process hearing in connection with the
school’s failure to consider their eligibility for ESY services. 232 The state-level
hearing resulted in a decision in favor of the students and recommendations for
the school district to develop interim guidelines. 233 Even after a favorable
administrative ruling, the school district continued to direct its staff to steer
children with disabilities away from ESY and encourage them to participate in
fee-based enrichment programs, and the case proceeded to the federal district
court in 1991. 234 The court found that the children with disabilities were
“entitled to speedy and effective relief” and that the school district was required,
“after years of avoidance of its responsibilities, [to] give [students with

224. Id. at 840–41.
225. Id. at 841.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 847.
230. 872 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994).
231. Id. at 1421. Plaintiffs also asserted claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
1424.
232. Id. at 1428.
233. Id. at 1428–29.
234. Id. at 1429. For insight on the school district’s decision to continue steering children with
disabilities away from ESY, see also Haekyoung Suh, Note, The Need for Consistency in Interpreting the
Related Services Provision Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1321,
1321 (1996) (“As funding for education diminishes, states are questioning their responsibility to provide
special education to children with disabilities.”).
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disabilities] their full measure of rights under the IDEA, including rights
regarding ESY.” 235 The Reusch court also noted the problematic nature of the
delay: it is “unacceptable for [the school district] to make decisions so late in
the school year that the [child] cannot exercise rights of review and/or be given
the ESY to which that child was entitled.” 236
L.D. ex rel. A.D. and Reusch illustrate the significant problems associated
with exhaustion: strict adherence to the requirement can lead to the denial of a
child’s statutory right to FAPE for multiple years while awaiting administrative
review, which results in irreparable educational harm. Making an exception that
considers the length and impact of delay and acknowledges that breaks and
disruptions in special education services can pose challenges to a child’s
educational progress is both consistent with the intent of the statute and is
necessary to prevent educational harm. For children with disabilities, multiyear disruptions can be insurmountable. The next section explores the
educational harm that can result when children with disabilities are unable to
obtain interim relief in the form of special educational services during this
protracted period of uncertainty.
2. Regression and Irreparable Educational Harm in ESY Cases
In certain IDEA cases, such as ESY-eligibility cases, the procedural delay
caused by the exhaustion requirement can result in irreparable educational harm
to the child. As Congress noted, “[D]elay in resolving matters regarding the
education program of [children with disabilities] is extremely detrimental to
[their] development.” 237 Additionally, “[t]he developmental years of children
are fleeting and critical” 238 and the “interruption or lack of the required special
education and related services can result in a substantial setback to the child’s
development.” 239 Moreover, “inappropriate classifications or programs can lead
to regression or to opportunities lost forever. . . . [This] is particularly dramatic
for children with disabilities.” 240 These setbacks—as recognized by Congress—
underscore the importance of handling these cases promptly.
Regression and educational harm are particularly evident in cases in which
the child is seeking time-sensitive services, such as ESY services. ESY services
are special education services that are provided beyond the typical 180-day
235. Reusch, 872 F. Supp. at 1424.
236. Id. at 1433. “Nearly 75% of all ESY decisions for the summer of 1992 were made after May 1,
1992. All denials of ESY occurred after that date and several occurred as late as June 23, 1992.” Id. “Dr.
Stanley Sirotkin, Supervisor of [the school district’s] Diagnostic Support Team, testified that he would
not consider a decision to be too late until mid- to late-August. The Court could not disagree more
with this remark.” Id.
237. 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
238. Lynch, supra note 214, at 186.
239. 121 CONG REC. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
240. Lynch, supra note 214, at 186.
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school year 241 “to prevent serious regression over the summer months.” 242 It has
been noted that “extend[ed] school time may be particularly helpful for those
students most at risk of failing.” 243
In 2019, Professors Lucy Barnard-Brak and Tara Stevens conducted a
study to “examine the association of ESY services with regression and a
subsequent lack of recoupment in academic achievement.” 244 Part of the study
focused on students who received ESY services and regressed in mathematics
and reading achievement compared to students who did not receive ESY
services. 245 The study used a data set of 740 kindergarten children with IEPs. 246
Parents were surveyed and, of those who responded, approximately 6% reported
that their child received ESY services, while 94% did not. 247 The study
determined a “twenty or more percent decline in achievement scores from the
spring of Kindergarten to the fall of 1st grade.” 248 The study further showed that
“[a]pproximately 7% . . . had regressed with respect to mathematics
achievement and did not readily recoup after the summer break” and
“[a]pproximately 1% . . . had regressed with respect to reading achievement and
did not readily recoup after the summer break.” 249 The study results indicated
that “[s]tudents who received ESY services were less likely to regress in
mathematics than students who did not receive those services,” 250 and
“[s]tudents who received ESY services were also less likely to regress in reading
than students who did not receive those services.” 251 The study concluded that
“students . . . who had received ESY services regressed significantly less than
their counterparts who did not receive ESY services.” 252 In another study,
which compared regression rates over the summer months of students with
reading disabilities to students without reading disabilities, the study found
statistically significant regression for the students with reading disabilities on

241. Queenan, supra note 26, at 166.
242. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1027–28 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
243. Erika A. Patall, Harris Cooper & Ashley Batts Allen, Extending the School Day or School Year:
A Systemic Review of Research (1985-2009), 80 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 401, 424 (2010).
244. Barnard-Brak & Stevens, supra note 23, at 5.
245. See id.
246. See id. Approximately 70% identified as male, 30% as female; approximately 50% White/nonHispanic, 13% African American, 26% Hispanic, 4% Asian, and less than 2% Native American or
Hawaiian; approximately 26% resided in rural areas, 29% in urban areas and 45% in suburban areas;
and average age was 69.43 months, or about six years. Id.
247. Id. ESY services are not a guarantee for children with IEPs. See, e.g., L.D. ex rel. A.D. v.
Sumner Sch. Dist., 166 P.3d 837, 839–41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 6.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 7.
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three of eight tested subjects while the group of students without reading
disabilities either improved or remained constant in all other tested subjects. 253
These studies confirm the need to address and resolve eligibility
determinations for time-sensitive special education services promptly to
prevent further educational harm caused by a lengthy administrative review.
This Article addresses that problem by recommending an exception in cases
where the procedural delay may result in irreparable educational harm.
3. Whether Interim Services Are Available Pending the Administrative
Determination
A related problem associated with the exhaustion requirement in certain
IDEA cases is the lack of interim services provided to children pending the
often-lengthy administrative review. While the IDEA contemplates this
potential harm when the child is in danger of losing services, there is no
protection for children who are seeking additional or new services during this
time.
One of the procedural safeguards included in the IDEA is what is known
as the “stay put” provision, which provides that a child “shall remain in [their]
then-current educational placement” 254 pending the completion of the
administrative review process unless the parties agree otherwise. This “stay put”
provision serves as an “automatic preliminary injunction . . . without regard to
such factors as irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and the
balancing of equities.” 255 “The purpose of [the] ‘stay put’ provision is to
253. Jessica Menard & Alexander M. Wilson, Summer Learning Loss Among Elementary School
Children with Reading Disabilities, 23 EXCEPTIONALITY EDUC. INT’L 72, 78–79 (2013). In another
study, which compared test scores of students who attended a summer program at a private school that
was intended for “students with learning differences” with those who did not attend the program, the
study “concluded that there was a statistical significance between the regression rates in both reading
vocabulary and reading comprehension among those who attended the summer program and those who
did not,” and those who did not attend the summer program “regressed in skills significantly.” Whitney
C. Sears, The Effects of Extended School Year on Students with Mild Disabilities and Its Relationship
to Regression Rate 2, 6–7 (Dec. 9, 2002) (M.S. Thesis, Longwood University) (on file with Digital
Commons at Longwood University) (noting that “[s]tudents identified with special needs have a
greater than average difficulty in recalling ‘mastered’ skills” and that “[s]tudents identified with these
weaknesses and other learning difficulties have a greater than average chance of ‘losing’ skills acquired
during the school year over the summer vacation as well as other long vacations during the school year.
This loss is called regression,” and “students with mild/moderate disabilities regress at a faster rate than
their peers” (citation omitted)).
254. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Courts have defined “then current educational placement” as “the
placement set forth in the child’s last implemented individualized education program.” Perry A. Zirkel,
“Stay Put” Under the IDEA: An Updated Overview, 330 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 8, 9–11 (2016) (citing
Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Off., 287 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2002)); Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub.
Schs., 199 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1999); J.W. ex rel. G.W. v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv00374, 2016 WL 1077544, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2016).
255. Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-6964, 2019 WL 4600870, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 21, 2019) (quoting N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ. v. S.S., No. 09 Civ. 810, 2010 WL 983719, at *6
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maintain the educational status quo while the parties’ dispute is being
resolved” 256 and applies “regardless of whether [the] case is meritorious or
not.” 257 It is also intended to “strip schools of the unilateral authority they had
traditionally employed to exclude [students with disabilities].” 258 But no similar
provision applies during a pending administrative review if the child is seeking
a new or additional special education service. In the absence of a statutory
amendment that extends the “stay put” provision, courts should take a more
flexible approach to the exhaustion requirement and allow parents to seek a
preliminary injunction as to whether they are entitled to receive such interim
services. A court could grant temporary relief if the child’s representative meets
the standard for an injunction using the factors in the irreparable harm
exception framework proposed in this Article. 259 A path for temporary
injunctive relief would prevent the educational harm that will occur if the child
is without services during the lengthy administrative process and subsequent
judicial review.
4. Whether the Harm Can Be Remedied at a Later Time
Time-sensitive eligibility cases further warrant an irreparable harm
exception because a court simply cannot make up for the loss of special
education services during a one- or two-year period pending administrative
review. Courts have attempted to do so by awarding compensatory education,
which is intended to “place [children with disabilities] in the same position they
would have occupied but for the school district’s violations of the IDEA.” 260
Initially, compensatory education was awarded in cases where the child sought
tuition reimbursement for private education to compensate parents who chose
to place their child in private school despite being denied such placement by
the school district. 261 Courts subsequently extended compensatory education to
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010)). The court in Avaras v. Clarkstown Central School District, No. 18-cv-6964,
2019 WL 4600870 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2019), incorrectly quotes the language from N.Y. City
Department of Education v. S.S., No. 09 Civ. 810, 2010 WL 983719 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2019), by using
“balancing of equities” instead of “balancing of hardships.” Compare Avaras, 2019 WL 4600870, at *2
(using the phrase “balancing of equities”), with N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 2010 WL 983719, at *6 (using
the phrase “balancing of hardships”).
256. Avaras, 2019 WL 4600870, at *3 (quoting A.M. ex rel. T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist.,
752 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2014)).
257. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).
258. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
259. A process that allows for an application for injunctive relief would allow the parties to submit
proof as to the child’s eligibility for services as a basis for providing interim services pending
administrative review. While this may be challenging for the courts, the relief would only be provided
in cases such as the time-sensitive eligibility determinations, where prompt relief is necessary to
prevent irreparable harm.
260. Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
261. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 362–63, 374 (1985)
(holding tuition reimbursements to be appropriate relief); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory
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include tutoring, summer school services, and compensatory occupational or
physical therapy services. 262 Compensatory education is thus broadly
understood as an after-the-fact “award of additional educational services to a
student . . . for past violations to a student’s right to an appropriate
education.” 263
But compensatory education is not an effective form of relief in cases
where the child is seeking services that are immediately necessary to provide
the child with a FAPE. Awarding compensatory education as a corrective
measure when the administrative body “is found to have erred in failing to
provide a proper placement” is not an appropriate way to address “[t]he delay
in obtaining the expected benefit.” 264 This can be seen in L.D. ex rel. A.D.,
where the court addressed the lack of ESY services provided to the child during
the summers of 2005 and 2006 by ordering the school district “to provide A.D.
with ‘the number of hours of instruction or counseling he would have received
if he had participated in a 2005 ESY program’” and that such services were “to
be delivered during mid-winter break, Spring break, Summer break, or Winter
break . . . through August 2007.’” 265 The court’s award of compensatory
education to A.D. during subsequent terms cannot adequately address the
regression A.D. suffered as a result of being denied services during the summer
of 2005—the time during which A.D. should have been provided with the
service in order to provide him with the required FAPE. As shown by the 2019
study, students experience significant regression when services are not
provided, even if the delay extends only to the subsequent school term. 266 The
best way to address the irreparable harm caused by exhaustion’s delay is to make
an exception to the exhaustion requirement and provide the child with the
opportunity for a prompt determination from the court as to whether the child
is eligible for services.

Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-leading
Position, 110 PA. STATE L. REV. 879, 883–84 (2006) (discussing the Third Circuit’s approach to tuition
reimbursement); Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Competing Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education
Under the IDEA, 339 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 10, 10 (2017).
262. Antonis Katsiyannis & John W. Maag, Ensuring Appropriate Education: Emerging Remedies,
Litigation, Compensation, and Other Legal Considerations, 63 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 451, 454 (1997).
263. Id. at 452. Compensatory education is “designed to make up for past deficiencies in a child’s
program.” Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Reid, 401 F.3d
at 522–23). Courts have also awarded more traditional remedies in IDEA cases, including
reimbursement for the cost of residential placement and legal fees. Katsiyannis & Maag, supra note
262, at 453.
264. See Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 780 (3d Cir.
1994).
265. L.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Sumner Sch. Dist., 166 P.3d. 837, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
266. Barnard-Brak & Stevens, supra note 23, at 7.
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IV. BEYOND THE IDEA: A BROADER APPLICATION OF THE IRREPARABLE
HARM EXCEPTION
Courts have long struggled with how to resolve requests for emergency
relief in the context of the exhaustion requirement. While exceptions have been
made, none have adequately focused on cases where the procedural delay results
in irreparable harm to the litigant. Some courts have expressed a willingness to
recognize an irreparable harm exception, but they have been unclear as to when
and whether to make an exception, which results in challenges for claimants and
much unnecessary litigation. The framework proposed in this Article would
provide clarity to litigants and greater procedural justice for those who need
prompt relief in order to avoid irreparable harm.
The irreparable harm analysis proposed in this Article considers whether:
(1) the procedural delay could result in irreparable harm; (2) the claimant is
entitled to interim relief pending the administrative review; and (3) the harm
can be adequately remedied at a later time. This framework is consistent with
the legislative intent of the IDEA, offers uniformity, and seeks to identify and
address cases where a litigant is seeking time-sensitive relief under
circumstances where prompt relief outweighs the benefit of strictly adhering to
the exhaustion requirement. The proposed framework also offers an approach
that draws from the futility and emergency exceptions contemplated by the
primary author of the IDEA. 267
Additionally, while an analysis of the exhaustion doctrine in other legal
contexts is beyond the scope of this Article, the proposed irreparable harm
exception framework could be used in other legal contexts where there is a
potential of irreparable harm to the claimant pending the administrative
process, such as in the context of a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). 268 The Supreme Court recently examined the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement and rejected the “special circumstances” “extra-textual
exception” that had been applied by the lower court. 269 However, the Court
noted that the PLRA “contains its own, textual exception” when administrative
remedies are “unavailable.” 270 According to the Court, “an inmate is required to
exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to
obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” 271 The Court remanded the
case for consideration as to “whether the remedies [the claimant] failed to
exhaust were ‘available.’” 272 While the Court noted three circumstances in
267. 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
268. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3625 and 28
U.S.C. § 1932).
269. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855–58 (2016).
270. Id. at 1858.
271. Id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).
272. Id. at 1862.
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which the remedy may not be “available,” 273 Justice Breyer noted, in his
concurring opinion, that “[t]hough [the] statutory term does not encompass
‘freewheeling’ exceptions for any ‘special circumstanc[es],’ it does include
administrative law’s ‘well-established exceptions to exhaustion.’” 274 This
suggests that the Court, or at least a contingent of the Justices, may be willing
to consider other exceptions to exhaustion under the PLRA, including an
exception based on futility or irreparable harm. 275 The irreparable harm
exception proposed in this Article can be applied as an additional way of
determining whether a remedy is “available” under the PLRA. Indeed, an
irreparable harm exception has been recognized as an exception within
administrative law litigation in other legal contexts.
This proposal also preserves the exhaustion requirement in cases where
there is no threat of irreparable harm. In the context of the IDEA, adherence
to the exhaustion requirement would continue in cases where the IDEA’s “stay
put” provision maintains the status quo, for example, a case in which the child
is challenging the school district’s determination to remove services the child is
currently receiving, because there is no threat of irreparable educational harm
pending the administrative review. Similarly, in other legal contexts, courts
have the power to issue injunctions exercised in order “to preserve the status
quo while administrative proceedings are in progress.” 276
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the IDEA to provide children with disabilities equal and
free access to a meaningful public education. A meaningful education requires
special education services tailored to an individual student’s needs. In many
cases, a delay or denial of such services while a case makes its way through a
lengthy administrative review process required by the exhaustion requirement
can cause the student to regress academically, resulting in irreparable
educational harm. In those situations, neither the intent of the statute nor the
benefit of exhaustion is fulfilled by strict adherence to the requirement. Courts
can address this by recognizing that an exception to exhaustion is warranted in
cases involving time-sensitive determinations related to eligibility for special
273. Id. at 1853–54 (noting three circumstances in which the remedy may not be available: (1)
“when it operates as a simple dead end”; (2) when “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that
it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; and (3) “when prison administrators thwart inmates
from taking advantage of [a grievance process] through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation”); see also Jacqueline Hayley Summs, Comment, Grappling with Inmates’ Access to Justice:
The Narrowing of the Exhaustion Requirement in Ross v. Blake, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 481–83 (2017).
274. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1863 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Woodford v.
NGO, 548 U.S. 81, 103 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
275. See Summs, supra note 273, at 484 (noting that the Court’s decision “suggests a softer—
perhaps more sympathetic—approach to reviewing inmate claims of exhaustion”).
276. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966).
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education services. In such cases, exhaustion is warranted because the denial of
services pending administrative resolution of the child’s case can create a
situation where the services, once denied, cannot be adequately provided at a
later time. In order to ensure that courts apply the exception consistently and
narrowly, this Article offers a framework that employs factors that directly
address this potential educational harm by considering the length of delay and
resulting irreparable educational harm, the potential for interim relief pending
the administrative review, and whether relief issued at a later time would be
adequate to remedy the educational harm.

